Journal of Accountancy
Volume 45

Issue 3

Article 9

3-1928

Book Reviews
Carl H. Nau
W. H. Lawton
W. B. Franke

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Nau, Carl H.; Lawton, W. H.; and Franke, W. B. (1928) "Book Reviews," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 45 : Iss.
3 , Article 9.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol45/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Book Reviews
THE ETIQUETTE OF THE ACCOUNTANCY PROFESSION. Gee &
Co., London. 85 pages.
The Etiquette of the Accountancy Profession, a little book of 85 pages, is a re
print of articles from The Accountant. The author is anonymous. The arti
cles are said to have been read and revised by the late Sir Arthur Whinney and
the present volume contains a foreword by Sir William Plender. The author,
himself, in a short introduction, recognizes “that professional ethics and pro
fessional etiquette are neither of them fixed and unalterable” and states his
purpose to be “to guide the practitioner, and particularly the young practitioner,
in doubtful cases” and whenever practicable to “distinguish between what
must be done by those who wish to avoid the pains and penalties of unprofes
sional conduct, and what in our judgment should guide those who aim at some
thing higher. It will, we hope, be recognized that it is not always practicable
to draw the line quite clearly between these two somewhat different standards
of professional conduct.”
The last quotation furnishes a clue to the point of view assumed by the
author in dealing with the questions and problems which are discussed in a
high minded, but in a very reasonable, undogmatic and altogether admirable
manner.
Much of the book is devoted to points which arise in English practice but
substantially never arise in American practice, so that this review must be lim
ited to a few quotations (and comments thereon) from chapters which deal with
matters of interest to American practitioners. Discussions which deal with
questions arising from accountants’ service as trustees or receivers in bank
ruptcy, as liquidators, as arbitrators or umpires, as estate agents, from their
practice as auctioneers or stockbrokers, or the operation of trade protective
associations, etc., and discussions which deal with the English custom of elec
tion of auditors by stockholders have no applicability to American practice.
These functions are not performed by American accountants (at least not as
accountants) and stockholders seldom, if ever, have anything to say about who
is employed to make an audit.
A thing which interested the reviewer was the implied distinction between
professional etiquette and professional ethics, although the author also implies,
in several instances, that these distinctions shade into each other so that no
clear line of demarcation can be drawn between the two subjects.
The following quotation from the foreword is especially apt:
“ Correctness in professional conduct can not be derived only from the
study of books; it is rather a matter of conscience than of codification.
Professional ethics and professional etiquette are not from their nature
immutable; and quite apart from the fact that every case has to be judged
on its own merits, which involves, or is thought to involve, infringement
of professional etiquette, there remains the fact that in a great number of
instances more than one view can legitimately be held.”

During the years in which this reviewer was officially charged with the duty
of interpreting and administering the American Institute’s rules of professional
conduct, he often said that placing the emphasis upon the letter of the precept
or rule rather than upon its spirit was not the proper mental attitude to take
toward one’s profession nor was it a course which would tend to advance its
dignity. If a line of conduct offends either an intelligent conscience or the
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canons of good taste, it is very apt to be an infraction of an ethical precept re
gardless of the fact that it may not, literally and specifically, be defined in the
rule. Indeed, it is possible for an act to be a literal violation of some rule and
be not at all unethical or in bad taste.
Of course, the person who is deficient in conscience or who is lacking in good
taste or who from unworthy motives is inclined to violate conscience and good
taste must be restrained by the letter of the law. The others do not need a law;
they regulate themselves. I am reminded of a discussion I heard in my
youth. At a dinner, the candidacy of a United States senator was being dis
cussed. An editor of what was then deemed to be a radical paper (today it
would be considered as ultra-conservative, if not reactionary) said that the
candidate in question had no conscience. To this a lawyer friend of the candi
date replied, “You are wrong—entirely wrong,” but after some hesitation he
added, “Yes, he has all sorts of conscience but he keeps it under blank good
control.” It is these kinds of people for whom rules must be made and laws
enforced.
The following quotations are illustrative of the English point of view which
is also the American point of view.
From the chapter on advertising:
"No doubt it (the rule) is based upon the general practice of all pro
fessional bodies, and is regarded as a necessary rule to uphold the proper
dignity of these professions. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that,
if advertising were permitted, the tendency would be for accountancy
business to go to those accountants who advertised most effectively, and
whatever might be said about this from the point of view of the clients’
interest, the custom would add greatly to the current working expenses
of the practising accountant.”
“That which is paid for is, prima facie, an advertisement, whereas that
which is not paid for is, prima facie, not an advertisement.”
“This brings into prominence the fact that the ‘free lance’ has an ad
vantage in the matter of advertising that is not possessed by the legitimate
practitioner, but we submit that the client in the long run gains no advan
tage by employing one who is not under the discipline of a well conducted
profession.”
From the chapter on giving estimates as to profits:
“ In the ordinary course chartered accountants must confine their re
ports to the facts, as disclosed by the books and supporting documents
they are called upon to examine and report upon, and must leave it to
others to draw deductions.”

From the chapter on “What is legitimate accountancy”:
“From our point of view, it is ‘legitimate accountancy’ for the profes
sional accountant to promote the interests of his clients in any legitimate
way connected not merely with account keeping but also with business
management, organization, or finance. When, therefore, we are asked to
discuss the propriety of professional accountants advising clients finan
cially on matters which come ‘ outside ’ a professional accountant’s work,
we are a little at a loss to understand what is really intended.”
From the chapter on professional secrecy and cases of suspected fraud:
“ It would seem that, if an accountant should discover that his employer
has made improper returns for the purpose, say, of income-tax assessment,
he would not be justified in disclosing the fact (voluntarily) but should
treat it with the same secrecy as other matters coming to his knowledge
in connection with his employer’s affairs. One point, however, is perfectly
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clear—he should in any case under such circumstances decline to go on with
the work, and should wash his hands of the whole matter, even if this in
volves losing the fee to which he would have been entitled on the comple
tion of his task; but need he go further?”
Readers of the book will find it to be interesting and well worth while. It
was especially interesting to this reviewer in its historical side lights and in the
discussions on points in which English practice differs from American practice.
It is noteworthy to observe that in all matters in which English practice is
analogous to American practice, rules of professional conduct have been
adopted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
similar to those which have been promulgated by the American Institute of
Accountants.
I unhesitatingly commend the book.
Carl H. Nau.

THE DAWES PLAN AND THE NEW ECONOMICS, by George P. Auld,
Doubleday, Page & Co., New York. 327 pages.
In Mr, Auld’s informative and perhaps timely book, The Dawes Plan and the
New Economics, we have a vivid description of the financial chaos in Europe
in 1922-24, caused by the deadlock on the reparations question between the
Allies and Germany; an account of the formation, personnel and work of the
Dawes Committee; a clear exposition of the Dawes plan which was accepted
by all parties to the controversy; and a lively polemic against Professor Keynes
and his followers who attempted, and still are trying, to discredit the plan.
For the benefit of the layman there is a preliminary chapter explaining in simple
language the “mystery” of foreign exchange. The final chapter is rather a
curious non sequitur. After having logically refuted the arguments advanced
by the Keynes school of “new economics” in favor of canceling the reparations
debt, Mr. Auld advocates the cancellation of that and of all other international
war debts. This surprising anti-climax seems utterly to destroy the value of
the book as a polemic. However, there is meat enough in the rest of the book
to make it worth while to readers wishing for a concise bird's-eye view of the
Dawes plan and how it is working out. Mr. Auld was formerly accountant
general of the reparations commission and therefore speaks with the authority
of one who knows the facts.
We live fast in these days and probably ninety-nine per cent. of the American
people have forgotten, if they ever realized, the chaotic state of affairs in Europe
in 1922-24. On May 1, 1921, the reparations commission had fixed the Ger
man debt at the astronomical figure of 31 billion dollars. Up to December,
1922, Germany had paid 1,200 million dollars, about half of which had gone
toward the costs of the armies of occupation. Then Germany asked for a
moratorium of three or four years, in which England joined with the additional
proposal that 18 billions of the total debt be canceled. France rejected the
proposals and occupied the Ruhr (as the commission declared Germany in
voluntary default). Germany’s chief industries were paralyzed and the mark
began its flight to the bottomless abyss. After two years of hopeless confusion
President Coolidge proffered the services of American experts to try to solve
the problem. The appointment of the Dawes committee followed in due
course. What the committee was authorized to do and what it actually did
form a striking parallel to the course followed by the convention which gave us
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our own constitution. The committee was authorized (1) to consider means to
balance the German budget and stabilize the currency; and (2) to consider
means of estimating the amount of exported capital and of bringing it back to
Germany. Not a word about reparations, be it observed! What it did was
to accomplish the above objects, and in addition to fix the annual charge for
reparations, and, in Mr. Auld’s opinion, to fix the total amount of reparations.
As a matter of fact the Dawes report carefully avoided fixing any limit what
ever, probably because the committee itself was known to be divided on the
question. Unable to agree on that point the committee wisely left it for future
consideration. The main thing was to get Germany back on her feet financially,
start the flow of trade and production, and give France some relief from her
burden of taxation.
So far Germany has met the requirements for reparations, viz:
For
“
“
“

1924-25..........................................
1925-26........................................
1926-27........................................
1927-28.........................................

250 million dollars
305
375
437½ “

With the year beginning September 1, 1928, she is required to pay the
standard annuity of 625 millions until 1940, and an additional annuity on rail
way bonds of 240 millions until 1964. These payments represent 5% interest
and 1% for sinking fund, and assuming that there will be no extension of these
annuities Mr. Auld estimates, on a 4% basis, that the capital sum of repara
tions is about 9 billion dollars. The plan also provides for additional increases
after 1929 based on a so-called “index of prosperity” in certain kinds of trade,
but, as these are purely problematical and speculative, Mr. Auld ignores them.
Such is the Dawes plan in brief, and so far it has worked smoothly, despite
the dismal predictions of Germany and the Keynes school every year that “next
year” it would fail. We now come to the crucial year of 1928 when the stand
ard annuity of 625 millions will be required. The usual prediction has been
made, and is somewhat enhanced by the weighty authority of Dr. Schacht, the
president of the reichsbank, who has suddenly become a convert to the new
economic theory regarding the transfer of funds across the frontier. Since
Germany is required only to pay in marks to the agent general and it is the
affair of the allied governments to get them transferred, Dr. Schacht seems
needlessly worried! However, as it is plainly only another move in the great
game of cancellation his motive is quite discernible. What is important to
America, since it vitally affects her future in foreign trade, is this new economic
theory by which Professor Keynes and his school of economists attempt to
prove the impossibility that reparations, or any other large international debts,
will ever be paid at all.
In brief the theory is this:
(a) International debts must be paid either in money (foreign exchange)
or in goods (export surplus);
(b) They can not be paid in money without disrupting foreign exchange
generally and causing world-wide disaster;
(c) They can not be paid in goods without ruining similar industries of the
creditor country, so goods will not be accepted in payment;
(d) Therefore, large international debts can not be paid at all. Q. E. D.
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To these propositions Mr. Auld replies that the flow of natural trade always
has and probably always will produce ample foreign exchange. In temporary
cases of excessive demand it will be met by new borrowings of capital as here
tofore. The great fallacy of the new economic theory is its assumption that
the huge capital sums involved must be met at any one time when all history of
funded debts, corporate or governmental, shows that payments of interest and
principal are made in a continuous flow of funding and re-funding. As well
might the holders of the bonds of our railroads be affrighted by pointing to the
stupendous total of them with the alarming warning that there is not enough
“money” in the world to pay them!
His chief argument is the actual experience of Europe in the years before the
war in collecting interest on foreign debts of 50 billion dollars.
I have said that Mr. Auld’s book is “perhaps” timely. A powerful party in
Germany has protested regularly every year against paying reparations at all,
and it may be that Dr. Schacht’s prediction of failure of the Dawes plan this
year is merely a habit, and Mr. Auld may be needlessly alarmed. Neverthe
less, it is well to note some rather important events of 1927 which lend color to
the suspicion that Germany, aided and abetted by the Keynes school of econo
mists, is about to launch a strong drive for cancellation. First, there is the
ominous, steadily growing deficit in the German budget to which the agent
general calls attention in his report for 1927—a deficit entirely due to swelling
governmental expenditures. Here is prima-facie ground for the claim that
Germany can not pay reparations. Second, there are the recently published
reports of Scandinavian pro-German savants declaring Germany guiltless of
provoking the world war, and manifestly the whole theory of reparations is
based on Germany’s guilt. Third, there is the rather disturbing suggestion
of the agent general himself, if he is correctly reported, that the amount of the
reparations debt should be finally assessed, the Dawes plan abandoned so far
as control over German finances is concerned, and Germany be left to her own
devices as to time and manner of payment. Considering these things it is quite
possible that there will be a battle over the Dawes plan this year, involving, of
course, a revival of the whole war-debt controversy. In that case America’s
interest in the fate of the Dawes plan is so great that Mr. Auld’s book is most
timely. Americans are prone to pay great respect to expert opinions uttered
by economists of such high standing as Professor Keynes, and it would be well
for us to know there is another side to the story. Mr. Auld tells it and tells it
most convincingly.
But why did he add that last chapter?
W. H. Lawton.
MECHANISM OF STANDARD COST ACCOUNTING, by Thomas Dow
nie, Jr. Gee & Co., Ltd., London. 117 pages.
This little book, called Mechanism of Standard Cost Accounting, is interest
ing particularly because of the amount of information which has been packed
into its few pages. One familiar with cost accounting of any sort would natu
rally assume that in a book of this size very little practical information could be
given. The author, however, has wasted no time on non-essentials, but has
devoted almost the whole of the book to practical discussion and supporting
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statements and forms. At the outset, he qualifies the information given by
stating that the methods described are “applicable only to factories engaged on
repetition or mass production work.” This qualification of the subject, of
course, enables him to condense the information presented.
After a discussion of the theoretical basis of cost accounting and the intro
duction of cost formulae, the author defines three common types of standard
cost accounting systems as follows:
(1) A system whereunder factory costs, stocks and cost of sales are carried in
the books at standard or predetermined values, the variance between standard
and actual values being segregated in “Variance accounts.”
(2) A system whereunder all figures are recorded in the general books at
actual cost but both standard and actual values are carried in the factory
books. Under this system the ratios of actual to standard costs are developed
by the work-in-progress accounts, these ratios being used to convert from
standard to actual cost finished goods put into stores or shipped.
(3) A system which differs from the second system outlined principally in the
methods of recording net good production and efficiency data.
Following this general outline, the author describes in detail systems (1) and
(2), supporting his descriptions with charts and forms setting forth the methods
by which costs are determined, and including pro forma journal entries, balancesheets, and profit-and-loss accounts.
To the practising accountant who does not specialize in the installation of
cost systems, but is occasionally asked to work up new standards for
standard cost accounting systems, or would like to own a practical ref
erence book on standard costs, this volume is recommended.
W. B. Franke,

234

